An asset-pricing perspective on inflation reveals that it depends on current and expected monetary and fiscal policies. There are three ways to carry $1 today into the future: money, bonds, and real assets. That dollar's purchasing power varies inversely with the price level. Expected money growth, tax rates, and government spending directly impinge on these expected rates of return of these assets, and determine the price level and the inflation rate. The paper considers a tax reduction that is financed by new government debt. It examines how alternative responses of current and future policies to the tax cut can imply very different outcomes for inflation.
This conventional description of macro policies is incomplete in ways that should disturb individuals making investment plans: it is silent on how policy behaves in the future. Yet current fiscal choices are necessarily linked to future fiscal decisions. Any change in policy today that alters the real value of debt held by the public must bring forth changes in future policies to support the new value of debt. For example, if a tax cut today is financed by new debt issuances, investors will buy the new bonds only if they expect the government will meet interest payments on the debt. But higher debt service requires either increases in revenues or decreases in other kinds of government spending. Whatever adjustment in policy investors expect will affect relative rates of return on assets and therefore portfolio choices and prices, including inflation.
Standard descriptions are incomplete because they include no explicit statement of how future policies are likely to adjust.
To complete the description of the inflation consequences of current policies, one must decide how likely are the various possible reactions of future policies to the resulting changes in level of government liabilities. This is a difficult task. The range, timing, and likelihood of future policies depend on imponderables like the political and economic environments that will prevail in the future. Will Americans tolerate tax increases better in the 21 st century than they have the past 20 years? Will geopolitical realities call for higher or lower expenditures on national security? Will the persistent imbalances in social security get resolved through higher taxes, lower benefits, or some other creative policy? Pondering these imponderables is essential to predicting the impacts of fiscal policy on inflation now and in the future.
Over the past 30 years, the conventional static perspective on policy has been extended to include an intertemporal dimension, often with surprising results. Barro (1974) showed that if individuals rationally discount the future tax liabilities associated with current bond-financed tax cuts, then tax-debt policies are neutral. Sargent and Wallace (1981) argued that if fiscal policy is constant in a certain sense, then tighter current monetary policy must raise inflation in the future and may even raise inflation now. Both unconventional outcomes hinge on particular assumptions about how future policies respond to expansions in government debt.
Dynamic analysis of macro policies leads to a more fundamental understanding of the inflationary impacts of fiscal policy than is reflected in the Keynesian perspective. The equilibrium price level and inflation rate emerge from the valuation of all assets jointly. By this perspective, current and expected future policies take center stage: it is not meaningful to ask about the effects of bigger budget deficits without coupling them with some consistent set of expected policies.
There is plenty of precedent for this topic that predates more recent, formal discussion. Important work includes Friedman (1948 Friedman ( , 1960 , Meltzer (1972, 1993) , and Tobin (1961 and Tobin ( , 1969 and Tobin ( , 1980 . Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) is a relatively recent important contribution. Sargent and Wallace (1981) lay the foundation for what is now referred to as "the fiscal theory of the price level," that Leeper (1991 Leeper ( , 1993 , Sims (1994) , and Woodford (1994 Woodford ( , 1995 develop.
The fiscal theory is now part of standard graduate macro curricula [Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) , Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) , Walsh (2002) , Woodford (2003) ].
Section I describes the asset-pricing perspective on fiscal policy and inflation in broad terms.
Section II explains the asset demand functions that emerge from the maximizing portfolio balance model described formally in an appendix. Section III discusses the dynamic linkages among macro policies. Section IV uses the asset demand functions and the dynamic linkages among policies to examine a simple version of the Bush tax cut. That tax cut is treated as a onetime tax reduction financed by sales of new government bonds. As we shall see, even this simple thought experiment is complicated to analyze. Alternative assumptions about how investors expect future policies will adjust to the increased government liabilities deliver very different results for current and future inflation rates.
Several themes run through the paper:
• Any statement about the impacts of monetary (fiscal) policy necessarily carries assumptions about fiscal (monetary) policy behavior. • Any given monetary (fiscal) policy action can generate a range of responses of current and future inflation, depending on what economic decision makers expect future policies will be. • Predicting the inflation consequences of a policy action requires specifying all current and expected future monetary and fiscal policies.
Section V applies the theory to address two practical issues tied to U.S. data: the possibility that countercyclical fiscal policies are counterproductive in the sense that they exacerbate and prolong the business cycle; the potential inflation impacts of U.S. demographic changes that imply substantial increases in social security and Medicare expenditures in this century. The paper concludes with a discussion of future directions for research.
I. An Asset-Pricing Perspective
Two key questions arise in dynamic analyses of policy: 
II. Portfolio Choices
The model, which an appendix formally describes, includes the three ways of carrying a Portfolio choices depend on relative rates of return on the three assets, as well as goods available to the private sector.
In general, asset demands depend on all rates of return and wealth, as Tobin (1969) showed many years ago. For analytical tractability, the formal model suppresses the dependence of the demand for capital on the returns to nominal assets. The model in the appendix delivers an investment decision that can be expressed as: (1) Subscripted variables prevail today (date t) and unsubscripted variables reflect expected future variables. * t y denotes resources available to the private sector and t η denotes what decision makers today expect will be the future paths of tax rates, τ , and government purchases as a share of output, g s . Positive and negative signs in parentheses above the function arguments report the signs of partial derivatives with respect to the arguments. Specifically, t η may be written as
, indicating that higher expected taxes reduce t η , while higher expected government purchases raise t η . Expression (1) may alternatively be written as
Higher expected taxes or lower expected government purchases increase current investment.
Interaction between supply and demand for money determines the price level. The money demand decision derived in the appendix is:
where t µ reflects today's expectation of the path of money growth, and may be expressed as
where ρ denotes the growth rate of the money supply in the future. Alternatively, the demand for money is:
reflecting the idea that if individuals expect higher money growth in the future-and hence a lower return to money-demand will decline. The presence of expected tax rates and government purchase shares arises from substitutions between assets: higher expected taxes or lower expected government purchases induce investors to substitute out of capital and into money. This reduces the current price level and inflation rate. Fiscal policy affects inflation by inducing shifts in portfolio choices. µ and η are policy expectations functions that capture the portfolio balance-or rate-ofreturn-effects of expected policies. They represent what decision makers need to know to form rational expectations over policy. µ is the marginal value of real money balances and determines the return on nominal assets. Higher expected money growth lowers µ and induces substitution out of money and into transactions services, raising current inflation. η measures the extent of direct tax financing, which determines the return on real assets.
Higher expected taxes (or lower expected government purchase shares) reduce η and generate substitution out of real assets into nominal ones, lowering current inflation.
In this simplified theoretical setting, once current policy choices are known and some position has been taken on what decision makers expect future policies will be, expressions (2) and (4) completely determine current output and inflation, subject to one important caveat.
The caveat is that not all combinations of current and expected future policies are feasible.
For example, if the real interest rate exceeds the economy's growth rate, it is not possible for the government to run primary budget deficits-meaning deficits net of interest payments on the debt-forever. 1 Such a policy involves the government financing debt service by selling new debt, which will make the path of debt explode. Investors, concluding the government will eventually fail even to meet debt service, will refuse to buy the newly issued bonds, unraveling the financing scheme. The only policies that can occur in equilibrium, therefore, are ones that are consistent with the government's budget constraint now and in the future.
III. The Government's Budget
Just like households and businesses, government decisions must satisfy a budget constraint.
Unlike private individuals, the government can print money, which generates inflation tax revenues (or seigniorage), and it can levy taxes, which generate direct tax revenues. Total government expenditures consist of purchases of goods and services (including compensation for government employees), transfer payments (including payments to individuals and state and local governments), and debt service (interest payments on outstanding debt). The government has three sources of revenues: direct tax revenues, seigniorage revenues, and any new bond sales above those required to pay off existing debt.
Expenditures and revenues are linked by the government's budget constraint:
/ .
purchases of goods services transfers payments debt service tax revenues seigniorage revenues net bond sales
Policy choices must satisfy this constraint every period.
In the absence of debt, government is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Each period all expenditures must be matched exactly by tax and seigniorage revenues. Nothing connects today's policies to tomorrow's.
But when there is some government debt outstanding, as has always been the case in the United States, then monetary and fiscal policies are intrinsically linked across time. If current policies change debt, then some future policy must change. Higher debt carries with it higher debt service, which is a component of fiscal expenditures. To service the higher debt, some combination of the following adjustments to future policy must occur: higher direct taxes, lower expenditures, or higher inflation taxes. In this sense, current policy choices impose restrictions on which future choices are possible.
The dynamic links also work in the direction from expected policies to current policy choices. Holding expected policies fixed, so future debt service is constant, some current policy must adjust to bring new debt issuances in line with the future debt service. Again, some combination of adjustments now in taxes, spending, or seigniorage must occur to be consistent with the fixed future policies. 2
The bidirectional linkages among monetary and fiscal policies can be depicted schematically as: 
An important implication emerges from the dynamic linkages between monetary and fiscal policies: a complete specification of policy behavior must include a set of current and future policies that are consistent with clearing the government's budget constraint now and in the future. Questions like "What are the effects of higher military spending or lower tax rates?" are ill-posed because they do not specify how other policies will adjust to ensure the budget constraint is satisfied. As the asset demand functions in equations (2) and (4) make plain, the consequences of a change in current fiscal policy for output and inflation depend critically on how decision makers expect future policies will react to any resulting change in the real value of government debt. Until future policies are specified, the best answer is "It depends."
In practical analyses, these dynamic links are often ignored. For example, in its publication
The Budget and Economic Outlook, the Congressional Budget Office forecasts the Federal budget deficit under the maintained assumption that current spending and tax policies remain unchanged. Because these assumed policies are almost never feasible, the forecasts the CBO reports can never actually occur. Analogous assumptions are embedded in other government and commercial forecasts.
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that on both theoretical and empirical grounds it is unappealing to maintain the implausible assumption of unchanged policies. in the conventional sense of printing money to purchase newly issued government debt, as many countries have done during hyperinflations. Instead, the expansion in money is a passive adjustment of the money supply to clear the money market at the prevailing nominal interest rate and price level.
IV. A Simplified Version of the Bush Tax Cut
The fiscal theory contrasts with the tax cut policy examined in Policy 1. That bond-financed tax cut was pure fiscal policy in the sense that it was independent of the path of the money stock.
It also reduced nominal spending and the price level. An essential aspect of the fiscal theory is that the current money stock adjusts to clear the money market, raising nominal demand and the price level. If policy authorities were pegging the nominal interest rate and fixing future taxes without reference to anything happening in the economy, the fiscal theory and higher prices are inevitable consequences of a tax cut. 
V. U.S. Fiscal Policy: Present and Future
Even readers intrigued by the economic logic of the previous arguments, may wonder about their quantitative significance and applicability to practical policy issues. This section aims to alleviate those concerns by applying the model described in sections II-IV to the potential for countercyclical policies to be counterproductive and to the inflationary implications of the projected paths of U.S. social security and Medicare expenditures.
Countercyclical Policies
In variants of the model above, Leeper (2000, 2002a) Although countercyclical policies arise from both automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy changes, for present purposes nothing rests on the precise mechanism that produces the policies. In terms of current fiscal policies, countercyclical policy is triggered by lower than normal output, and brings forth a lower than normal tax rate and a higher than normal government spending share. Monetary policy responds over the cycle to two factors. First, to accommodate the decline in money demand associated with an economic contraction, the Federal Reserve reduces money growth. Second, to counteract the downturn, the Fed reduces the nominal interest rate by increasing the growth of high-powered money. The net effect is procyclical money growth, which appears in statistical characterizations of the data [see Cooley and Hansen (1995) ]. With substantial fractions of the variation in portfolio choices attributable to current and expected macro policies, those policies evidently have important quantitative impacts.
Social Security and Medicare
Combining the gradually aging U.S. workforce with existing provisions for social security and Medicare carries profound implications for future government liabilities. The Congressional Budget Office's (2002) projections for growth in the government's claims on the economy are summarized in Table 2 . Future government liabilities are likely to grow substantially, a situation that cannot persist without substantial shifts in other policies. Which policies are expected to change determines the impacts on current and future inflation.
Rising social security, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures appear as an increase in expected transfer payments, z s , in the model. We assume-perhaps unrealistically-that z s cannot be changed, so there will be no reductions in benefits from the social programs. There are two possible responses of policy: hold current policies fixed so that no new debt is carried into the future or adjust current policies so that a lower level of debt is carried into the future. 6
Each of these requires specifying further adjustments in policies to determine their impacts. 7
If current policies are fixed, then as section III recounted, there is some set of future policies consistent with higher z s , given debt inherited from the past. Suppose that future purchases and tax rates are unchanged. Then higher money growth must be expected to raise the revenues needed in the future. Higher money growth ( ρ ) reduces the value of money balances now (lower µ ), which induces individuals to substitute out of money. Both current and future inflation rates would have to rise substantially given the magnitudes reported in Table 2 . In contrast, if future money growth is fixed, then some combination of lower government purchases, g s , and higher tax rates, τ , must be expected to adjust. This policy shifts expected future financing away from inflation taxes and toward income taxes (lower η ), reducing the expected return on capital.
Individuals substitute out of real assets into nominal ones today. Higher money demand reduces the price level and inflation rate today. Because the capital stock declines, output is lower in the future, which drives up the price level in the future, for a given path of the money stock. Lower inflation today is followed by higher inflation tomorrow.
It may be possible for current policies to adjust sufficiently so that a lower level of debt is carried into the future and future policies do not need to change to accommodate the higher transfer payments. Essentially, this makes some of the outlays on interest expenses in Table 2 available for social security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Reducing debt carried into the future requires some combination today of higher money growth, lower government purchases, lower transfers, or higher taxes. Higher money growth today acts as a lump-sum (non-distorting) tax on nominal assets and the price level rises proportionately. Lower transfers or higher taxes now are also lump-sum and have no impact on the equilibrium (a feature special to this economic model). A cut in purchases, however, frees up resources available to the private sector, which increases money demand and reduces the current price level.
The wide range of possible consequences from projected government transfer payments actually understates the uncertainty surrounding the issue. Policy reforms that seem politically impossible now become increasingly likely as the budgetary consequences are realized. As the political situation evolves in the future, it's likely that some of the future policy adjustment will occur in benefits, so transfers ultimately will rise less than the CBO now projects.
VI. Directions for Research
Exploration of the implications of explicitly modeling dynamic interactions among current and expected future macro policies has just begun. So far the explorations have used stylized economic environments and a limited range of assumptions about how expectations are formed.
How expectations are estimated matters a great deal in this analysis. Perfect foresight represents one extreme [Gordon and Leeper (2000) ], while econometric methods that rely entirely on historic correlations to project future policies represent another extreme [Gordon, Leeper and Zha (1998) ]. Reality doubtless lies in between. Research suggests Americans have some foresight of fiscal policy [Steigerwald and Stuart (1997) ] and analytical work suggests that sorting out the degree of foresight may be important for obtaining good quantitative estimates of monetary and fiscal impacts [Leeper (1989) and Yang (2002) ].
There is another aspect of getting accurate assessments of expectations of policy: if policy can shift randomly but infrequently between rules (or "regimes"), then the regime switching should be modeled so expectations of policy incorporate any possible future regime changes.
This point was made in the context of the Lucas (1976) critique by Cooley, LeRoy and Raymon (1984) . In the context of fiscal policy, Davig (2002a Davig ( , 2002b shows that elasticities with respect to tax changes can take a variety of magnitudes and signs, depending on private agents' beliefs about fiscal regime. It is possible to extend the simple assumptions about policy made in the text to allow policies to switch randomly among Policies 1-3. This qualitatively changes the nature of the equilibrium.
How people learn about policy is also likely to be important for accurately determining policy impacts. Sargent (1999) reaches the pessimistic conclusion that a return to the days of high inflation cannot be ruled out.
Embedding learning in an environment with nontrivial monetary and fiscal policy interactions could offer a very different, and far richer, interpretation of history.
Empirical work on monetary and fiscal interactions is very much in its infancy. To date the work focuses on trying to isolate particular historical episodes in which Policy 1, 2 or 3 operated, without modeling the probabilities of switching between policy regimes [Cochrane (1999) , Woodford (1999) , Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) ].
All of these extensions amount to different ways to converting "imponderables" into things we can understand and analyze. Endnotes 1 If the economy grows at a rate faster than the real interest rate, then it is possible to "grow out of the deficits." 2 The appendix derives these linkages explicitly in the formal model. 4 See also Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995) . As Cochrane (2001) observes, the precise result discussed relies on government debt being sold at par. If it sold at a discount instead, the price of bonds may absorb some of the adjustment to equilibrium, offsetting some of the price level impacts. 5 Perfect foresight is a limiting case of the idea that agents have good information about tax rates and government spending some quarters into the future. 6 We do not consider what may be the least politically costly option: ease immigration restriction sufficiently so foreign workers in the United States can finance social security and Medicare. 7 Auerbach (2002) evaluates the impacts of the tax cut enacted in June 2001 on national savings.
His analysis, though quantitative, is similar in spirit to ours in that he considers the implications of alternative expected future policies consistent with equilibrium. He does not derive the implications for the price level and inflation, however.
taking the tax rate, τ, and r as given.
Transactions service producing firms rent labor, l, from households at wage rate w and sell transactions services, ( ) T l , to households at price T P . The function ( ) T ⋅ is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable. Firms choose l to solve max ( ) ,
taking T P and w as given. Both firms behave competitively.
The household owns the firms and receives factor payments, so its income at the beginning of period t is Including investment goods in the finance constraint, as in Stockman (1981) , is substantive. Excluding investment goods implies that the acts of investing or reallocating investments do not generate any demand for money or for transactions services. 3 One can imagine the representative household composed of a worker/shopper pair. Each member of the household is endowed with a unit of time each period and specializes in the production of a specific commodity. The worker supplies labor inelastically to the goods producing firm and the shopper supplies labor elastically to the transactions services producing firm. The worker's labor supply is unity and the shopper's labor supply is l .
